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"SILENCE IS A FENCE AROUND WISDOM"I:
HOW CONANT V. WALTERS BROKE DOWN
THE FENCE BY SECURING PHYSICIANS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
RECOMMEND MEDICAL MARIJUANA TO
THEIR PATIENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Conant v. Walters,2 upholding a physician's First
Amendment right to recommend medical marijuana to seriously
ill patients. The court affirmed the district court's permanent
injunction, which enjoined the federal government from "(i)
revoking [a] physician['s]... DEA registration [to prescribe
controlled substances] merely because the doctor makes a
recommendation for the use of medical marijuana based on a sincere
medical judgment and (ii) from initiating any investigation solely on
that ground." 3 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit properly held that the
government's federal drug policy was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech. The court recognized, however, a limit
to the physicians' free speech. It affirmed the district court's holding
that the government could take administrative action against a
physician if it believed in good faith that it had "substantial
evidence" that "[a] physician aided and abetted the purchase,
cultivation, or possession of marijuana, or enga,4ed in a conspiracy to
cultivate, distribute, or possess marijuana.
Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's decision finally clarified for physicians that, within a bona
fide doctor-patient relationship, they may recommend or discuss1. Jewish proverb, available at http://www.worldofquotes.com/proverb/
Hebrew/l/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
2. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
3. Id. at 634.

4. Id. at 633 (citations omitted).
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but not assist their patients in obtaining-medical marijuana,
essentially lifting a.gag order that had been in place since early 1997.
The Ninth Circuit's decision is a hollow victory in some ways.
Although physicians can recommend medical marijuana, there is still
very little that seriously ill patients can do to act upon such a
recommendation. At the very least, however, patients will be better
informed about their medical conditions and can join the debate
about medical marijuana if they so desire. Moreover, at a time when
medical marijuana is becoming more widely accepted in the United
States, the court's decision is a positive step towards helping to
eliminate the government's negative policies pertaining to the use of
medical marijuana and perhaps one day establishing a legal supply
system for patients to procure the drug.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. California's Compassionate Use Act
On November 5, 1996, Californian voters passed Proposition
215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. 5 It provides, in pertinent
part:
seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a
physician who has determined that the person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of
cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma,
arthritis, migraine,
or any other illness for which marijuana
6
provides relief.
It also protects physicians who recommend medical marijuana,
stating that "no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied
any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a
patient for medical purposes."7

5. Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13024, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000).

6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (Deering 2000)
(emphasis added).
7. Id. § 11362.5(c). In addition, eight other states, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, enacted medical
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B. The ControlledSubstances Act and the FederalGovernment's
Response to the Compassionate Use Act
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) regulates the manufacture
and distribution of dangerous drugs.8 It gives the government
authority, through the office of the Attorney General, to register
physicians and other manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of
controlled substances. 9 In certain circumstances, the CSA authorizes
the government
to deny, revoke, or suspend a physician's
10
registration.
The CSA classifies dangerous drugs in one of five "Schedules"
depending on various factors. The government applies the strictest
regulation to Schedule I drugs, including marijuana, because it
determined that they have "a high potential for abuse," "no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and "a lack
of accepted safety for use... under medical supervision."" The
CSA forbids physicians from prescribing Schedule I drugs and
allows their use in the United States only
for "strictly-controlled,
2
programs.'
research
federally-approved
On December 30, 1996, less than two months after Californians
enacted the Compassionate Use Act, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy released the "Administration Response to Arizona
Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215" (Response). 13 The
Response stated that it was the position of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) "that a practitioner's action of recommending or prescribing
Schedule I controlled substances is not consistent with the 'public
marijuana laws by either voter initiative or legislative enactment. Conant, 309
F.3d at 643 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
9. See id. §§ 821-830.
10. See id. § 824. The Attorney General has delegated the authority to
grant, deny, and revoke registrations to the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). See 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2003). Accordingly, a physician must
initially obtain a registration from the DEA in order to prescribe any controlled
substance.
11. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2000); see Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 9700139 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000);
Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
12. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *3.
13. Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
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interest' (as that phrase is used in the federal Controlled Substances
Act) and will lead to administrative action by the Drug Enforcement
14
Administration (DEA) to revoke the practitioner's registration."'
The DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) clarified the Administration's position in a letter to national,
state, and local practitioner associations dated February 27, 1997.15
The letter assured that "nothing in federal law prevents a physician,
in the context of a legitimate physician-patient relationship, from
merely discussing with a patient the risks and alleged benefits of the
use of marijuana to relieve pain or alleviate symptoms." 6 It also
cautioned physicians, however, that they "may not intentionally
provide their patients with oral or written statements in order to
enable them to obtain controlled substances in violation of federal
17
law."
C. The Plaintiffs and Their Lawsuit
The plaintiffs in Conant included physicians licensed to practice
in California who treated patients with serious illnesses, patients
suffering from serious or terminal illnesses, a physicians'
organization, and a patients' organization.1 8 After the government
issued its Response, a number of California physicians, including the
plaintiffs, feared that the government would prosecute them, or that
they would lose their DEA registration to write prescriptions if
they either discussed medical marijuana with their patients or
recommended it to them. 19 There was also a great deal of confusion
among physicians as to what qualified as a "recommendation. ' 2° As
a result, many physicians began to self-censor their conversations
with patients, withholding information, recommendations, or advice
14. Id.
15. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *7.

16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *15. A number of the
plaintiff physicians expressed this fear even after the preliminary injunction
took effect in April 1997. Id.
20. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The
government's policy on medical marijuana was so ambiguous and
contradictory that even its own attorneys were unable to clearly articulate its
meaning. Id. at 691.
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regarding the use of medical marijuana.
Some physicians omitted
medically relevant information from patients' medical charts.22
Perhaps most significant was the government's acknowledgment
that, in reaction to the Response, "a reasonable physician would have
a genuine fear of losing his or her DEA registration to dispense
controlled substances if that physician were to recommend marijuana
to his or her patients. 23
The plaintiffs filed the original action in early 1997, seeking to
enjoin that part of the federal policy that threatened to punish
24
physicians for discussing medical marijuana with their patients.
The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the government's threats
to punish physicians for communicating with their patients about the
use of medical marijuana violated the First Amendment.
On April 30, 1997, District Judge Fern Smith issued a
preliminary injunction. 26
The government never appealed the
preliminary injunction, which remained in effect even after Judge
Alsup took over the case on August 19, 1999.27 Judge Alsup
dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a permanent
injunction,28 which enjoined the government from
(i) revoking any physician class member's DEA registration
merely because the doctor makes a recommendation for the
use of medical marijuana based on a sincere medical
judgment and (ii) from initiating any investigation solely on
21. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *14.
22. Id. Both parties agreed that "accurate charts are necessary to provide
sound medical care to the patient in the future, either by the same physician or

by a different physician, and the failure to accurately chart a patient's care
could jeopardize the patient's life and health." Id. at *14 n.2.
23. Id. at* 15.
24. Id. at *16.
25. Id.

26. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2002). Judge Smith,
who was the first judge assigned to the case, presided over it for over
two years. Id. The preliminary injunction prohibited the government from
"'tak[ing] administrative action against physicians for recommending
marijuana unless the government in good faith believe[d] that it ha[d]

substantial evidence' that the physician aided and abetted the purchase,
cultivation, or possession of marijuana, or engaged in a conspiracy to cultivate,
distribute, or possess marijuana." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Conant v.
McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 700 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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that ground. The injunction should apply whether or not
the doctor anticipates that the patient will, in turn, use his or
her recommendation to obtain marijuana in violation of
federal law.29
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CONANT V. WALTERS

After the district court issued the permanent injunction,
the
30
government appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
A. Aiding and Abetting
The court first addressed whether a physician's recommendation
of medical marijuana would lead to illegal use of the drug. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and agreed with the district
court that there were "many legitimate responses" to a physician's
recommendation of medical marijuana to a patient.31 For example, a
physician could try to place a patient in a federally-approved
experimental marijuana therapy program, or upon receiving a
recommendation of medical marijuana from a physician, a patient
could petition the government
to change the law regarding the
32
drug.
the
of
use
medical
The court then addressed whether a physician's recommendation
of medical marijuana was analogous to a prescription of a controlled
substance. 33 The court found that the government, which argued that
a recommendation was essentially a prescription, was interpreting
the injunction too broadly.34 The court clarified that if a physician
who recommended medical marijuana to a patient intended for the
patient to use the recommendation-like a prescription-to obtain
marijuana, then the physician would be guilty of aiding and
abetting.35
The court went on to consider whether the permanent injunction
protected criminal conduct because it applied even when a physician
anticipated that a patient would use the physician's recommendation
29. Id. at 634 (quoting Conant, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *47-*48).
30. Id.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id.

35. Id.
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to obtain marijuana in violation of federal law.36 In addressing this
issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's statement of
the law pertaining to aiding and abetting.37 The court also relied on
United States v. Gaskins38 for its test for aiding and abetting, holding
that the government must prove the following four elements to obtain
a conviction for aiding and abetting:
(1) that the accused had the specific intent to facilitate the
commission of a crime by another, (2) that the accused had
the requisite intent of the underlying substantive offense,
(3) that the accused assisted or participated in the
commission of the underlying substantive offense, and (4)
that someone committed the underlying substantive
offense.39
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's test for
conspiracy, which required that a defendant make "'an agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective and [that he] knows of the illegal
objective and intends to help accomplish it."AO
Using these tests, the court held that "[a] doctor's anticipationof
patient conduct... does not translate into aiding and abetting, or
conspiracy." 1 The court reasoned that aiding and abetting requires a
physician to have the specific intent to provide a patient with a
means to obtain marijuana.42 In addition, the court stated that
conspiracy requires that the physician know that a patient intends to
obtain marijuana, agree 4to
help the patient obtain it, and intend to
3
it.
obtain
patient
the
help
36. Id.
37. Id. According to Judge Smith, a conviction for aiding and abetting
required proof that the defendant ."associate[d] himself with the venture, that
he participate[d] in it as something that he wishe[d] to bring about, that he
[sought] by his actions to make it succeed."' Id. (alterations in original)
(quoting Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 700 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.

164,190 (1994)).
38. 849 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Conant, 309 F.3d at 635 (quoting Gaskins, 849 F.2d at 459).

40. Id. (quoting McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. at 700-01).
41. Id. at 635-36 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 636.

43. Id. The court also dismissed the government's argument that the

injunction barred it from investigating suspected criminal misconduct, finding

that the government erroneously misconstrued language in the permanent
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In sum, the court found that a physician's recommendation of
medical marijuana could lead to any number of legitimate responses
by a patient. Therefore, by simply recommending the drug, a
physician does not automatically aid and abet a crime. Moreover,
aiding and abetting only becomes an issue when a physician has the
specific intent to provide a patient with a means to acquire medical
marijuana. Thus, if a physician merely anticipatesthat a patient may
use a recommendation to obtain the drug illegally, the physician is
not guilty of aiding and abetting.
B. FirstAmendment Analysis

The Ninth Circuit next analyzed whether the government's
federal drug policy violates a physician's First Amendment rights.
The court considered three issues. First, it determined whether
the First Amendment protects physician speech. Next, the court
considered whether the federal policy is a content-based and
viewpoint-based restriction. Finally, the court addressed whether,
under the standard of strict scrutiny, the government could justify a
restriction of protected speech.
If a regulation is aimed at suppressing the subject matter of
speech, it is considered a content-based regulation and will receive
strict scrutiny. 44 Accordingly, a court applying strict scrutiny will
uphold a content-based restriction only if: (1) it furthers a compelling
government interest, and (2) it is narrowly tailored to use the least
restrictive means possible to further the interest.45 The Supreme
Court has held that "'[r]egulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment."' 4 6 This is due to the concern
injunction that differed slightly from language in the preliminary injunction.
Id. The court interpreted the permanent injunction as enjoining essentially the

same conduct as the preliminary injunction. Id. It found that because a

physician's recommendation was not illegal conduct, the part of the injunction
that excluded investigations solely on that basis did not get in the way of the
federal government's ability to enforce its laws. Id.
44. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989)).
45. Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 126.
46. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 126 (1991) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
648-49 (1984)).
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that when the government regulates speech based on its content, it
will drive certain topics and viewpoints from the marketplace of
ideas. 47 As the Court held in Texas v. Johnson,48 "If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
49
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.
Thus, even though the government does not approve of medical
marijuana, it does not follow that it can necessarily restrict
physicians from discussing the drug with their patients.
Furthermore, content-based regulations that attempt to suppress
particular viewpoints on a topic may have an even stronger
presumption of invalidity. For example, in Rosenberg v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia,50 the Court clearly stated its
disfavor of such restrictions:
When the government targets not subject matter, but
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of
content discrimination. The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or
the opinion or 5perspective
of the speaker is the rationale for
1
the restriction.
Thus, courts presume that content-based speech restrictions,
particularly those targeted at specific viewpoints, are invalid.
Although content-based speech restrictions are presumptively
invalid, they are not absolutely precluded. The government may
impose a content-based restriction, but only if it meets the two
requirements of strict scrutiny. Accordingly, for a content-based
restriction to be upheld, it must promote a compelling government
interest, and the government must narrowly tailor the means it uses
to achieve that interest.
After finding that physician speech received First Amendment
protection, the Conant court concluded that the government's policy
prohibiting physicians from recommending medical marijuana to
47. Id.

48. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
49. Id. at 414.
50. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

51. Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
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their patients was a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction.
Then, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and found that the
policy restricting physician speech was not justified by a compelling
government interest, and it was not narrowly tailored.
1. Physician speech and the First Amendment
The Ninth Circuit found that communication between physicians
and their patients was an "integral component of the practice of
medicine., 52 Citing Trammel v. United States,53 the court stressed
the importance of physicians being able to speak openly and honestly
with their patients.54 In Trammel, the Supreme Court held that the
doctor-patient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust." 55 The Court further held that "the physician
must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to
treat disease;
barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and
56
treatment.,
Further acknowledging the significance of the doctor-patient
relationship, the Ninth Circuit found that the Supreme Court had
57
recognized that the First Amendment protects physician speech.
The court relied on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey58 and Rust v. Sullivan59 in reaching its
conclusion. According to the Ninth Circuit, the Casey Court
recognized that physicians have a First Amendment right not to
speak, while the Court in Rust held that some regulations
on physician speech may "'impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship."' 60 In addition, the court found that Rust did not uphold
restrictions on speech itself, but rather it upheld restrictions
on federal funding for specific types of activity, such as
abortion counseling, referral, or advocacy. 61 Lastly, the court noted
that in Casey, although a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld
52. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002).
53. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
54. Conant, 309 F.3d at 636.
55. Trammel; 445 U.S. at 51.
56. Id.
57. Conant, 309 F.3d at 636.

58. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
59. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
60. Conant, 309 F.3d at 636 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 200).

61. Id. at 638.
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Pennsylvania's requirement that a physician advise a patient about
the health risks associated with an abortion and provide alternatives
to abortion, the Court also recognized that physicians did not have to
comply with the law if they had a reasonable belief that the
information would have a "'severely adverse effect on the physical
or mental health of the patient.' 62 Whereas the statute in Casey "did
not 'prevent the physician from exercising his or her medical
judgment, ' '63 according to the court, the government's policy in
Conant did precisely that.64
The Ninth Circuit next analyzed whether the fact that physicians
are members of a regulated profession means that they must
relinquish their First Amendment rights. Relying on FloridaBar v.
Went For It, Inc.,65 the court firmly held that "professional speech
may be entitled to 'the strongest protection our Constitution has to
offer.' ' 66 The court also noted that the First Amendment even
protects commercial speech by professionals, citing Bates v.
67
68
Lastly, the court pointed to
Arizona to support its conclusion.
NAACP v. Button 69 for an example of how attorneys have the right
"to speak freely subject
only to the government regulating with
'narrow specificity."' 70
Within the context of its discussion of the physicians' First
Amendment rights, the court relied on a recent Supreme Court
decision that dealt specifically with regulating speech about
71
controlled substances, Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.
The Court in Thompson found that "provisions in the Food and Drug
Modernization Act of 1997 that restricted physicians and pharmacists
from advertising compounding drugs violated the First
Amendment. 72
Moreover, the Court declined "to make the
62. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883-84).
63. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).
64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.

515 U.S. 618 (1995).
Conant,309 F.3d at 637 (quoting FloridaBar, 515 U.S. at 634).
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Conant, 309 F.3d at 637. In Bates, the Supreme Court held that

advertising by attorneys could not be subject to blanket suppression. 433 U.S.
at 382-83.
69. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
70. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433).
71. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
72. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (citing Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360).
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'questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary
medications' and rejected the government's argument that 'people
would make bad decisions if given truthful information about
compounded drugs."', 73 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the
government's argument in the present case-that a physician-patient
discussion about medical marijuana may result in the patient making
a bad decision-was the same paternalistic reasoning that was flatly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Thompson.74 Thus, the court
refused to accept the argument proffered by the government,
emphasizing the warning the Supreme Court gave in Thompson: "'If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating
speech must be a last-not first-resort. Yet here it seems to have
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.'75
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that because of the
significance of the physician-patient relationship, communication
between doctors and their patients is protected by the First
Amendment, even though physicians are a part of a regulated
profession and the communication pertains to a controlled substance.
2. The government's policy is a content-based and viewpoint-based
restriction
The court also addressed whether the government was punishing
physicians based on the content of their speech, because it was clear
that the only time a doctor-patient conversation triggered the
government's policy was when it included a discussion of medical
marijuana.76 The court found support from R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul7 7 in asserting that content-based restrictions on speech are
"'presumptively invalid.' 78 The court recognized that the
government's policy not only prohibited a discussion of medical
marijuana, but also denounced the expression of a particular
viewpoint, namely, that a specific patient might benefit from the
drug. 79 The court held that within the context of the First
73. Id. (quoting Thompson, 535 U.S. at 374).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373).

76. Id.
77. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
78. Conant,309 F.3d at 637 (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382).

79. Id.
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Amendment, such condemnation of particular views was "especially
troubling."'8° Relying on Rosenberg, the court noted that when the
government attempts to suppress a speaker's viewpoint on a
particular subject,
"'the violation of the First Amendment is all the
81
more blatant."'
The court analogized the restriction on medical advice in Conant
to a similar policy that the Supreme Court struck down in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez. 82 Velazquez dealt with a government
restriction that prohibited legal assistance organizations that received
federal funds from challenging existing welfare laws. 83 The
restriction forbade attorneys from "'present[ing] all the reasonable
and well-grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the
case.' 84 The court held that like the restriction in Velazquez, the
government's policy in Conant "'alter[ed] the traditional role"' of
physicians by "'prohibit[ing]85 speech necessary to the proper
functioning of those systems.'
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government's
policy on recommending medical marijuana was a content-based and
viewpoint-based restriction because it took effect only after a
physician discussed the drug with a patient and voiced an opinion on
it that was contrary to the government's view.
3. The government's restriction on speech is not justified by a
compelling interest
The Ninth Circuit then explored whether the federal policy
furthered a compelling government interest. The government
justified its policy by asserting that a doctor's recommendation of
medical marijuana might encourage a patient to engage in illegal
conduct. 86 Therefore, the government presumably had a compelling
interest in keeping patients from potentially taking part in such
conduct. The court compared the government's argument to a
similar one previously rejected by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
80.
81.
Univ.
82.
83.

Id.
Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (quoting Rosenberg v. Rector and Visitors of
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Conant, 309 F.3d at 638 (citing Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537-38).

84. Id. (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545).
85. Id. (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544).

86. Id.
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Free Speech Coalition, Inc.. 87 Free Speech Coalition dealt with
virtual child pornography and the government's defense of the Child
Pornography Prosecution Act of 1996.88 The government argued
that pedophiles might use virtual images to encourage children to
participate in sexual activity. 89 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the government's assertion and held that "'[w]ithout a
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may
not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage... illegal
conduct."' 90 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
government's argument in defending its marijuana 9 1 policy
"mirror[ed]" the argument rejected in Free Speech Coalition.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the government may not
restrict physician speech about medical marijuana solely because
such speech may encourage people to engage in illegal activity.
4. The government's policy is not narrowly tailored
Finally, the court focused on the "'narrow specificity"'
requirement that the government's drug policy needed to meet in
order to survive First Amendment scrutiny.92 The court stressed that,
throughout the litigation of Conant, the government was unable to
describe precisely what speech the policy prohibited.93 As a result,
the government merely described the speech as a communication that
94
the patient believed to be a recommendation of medical marijuana.
Therefore, the court concluded that the determination of whether a
doctor-patient conversation regarding medical marijuana constituted
a "recommendation" depended on the meaning the patient gave to
the physician's words. 95 Relying on precedent established by
Thomas v. Collins,96 the court held that under the First Amendment,
this type of uncertainty is not allowed.97 According to the court, the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Conant, 309 F.3d at 638.
Id. (citing Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S at 250).
Id. (quoting Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253-54).
Id.
Id. at 639 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
Id.
Id.
Id.

96. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
97. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639.
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Supreme Court in Thomas struck down a state statute because it did
not make a clear distinction between union membership, solicitation,
"and mere 'discussion, laudation, [or] general advocacy.' ' 8 The
court then compared the government's policy to the statute in
Thomas, stating that the policy, like the statute, left physicians and
patients "'no security for free discussion."' 99 The court emphasized
that because of the "'fickle iterations of the government's policy,"'
physicians were suppressing speech that the First Amendment
protected.100

In sum, because the government's policy on recommending
medical marijuana did not specify exactly what speech is proscribed,
the Ninth Circuit found that the policy chilled constitutionally
protected speech and, accordingly, the policy was not narrowly
tailored.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Conant v. Walters properly held
that the First Amendment protects a physician's right to recommend
medical marijuana to a patient within a bona fide doctor-patient
relationship. On the other hand, in Pearson v. McCaffreyll-a
comparable case dealing with physicians and patients who also
challenged the federal medical marijuana policy on First Amendment
grounds-the District Court of the District of Columbia incorrectly
10 2
reached the opposite conclusion.
While both cases have similar facts, the Conant court, in
comparison to the court in Pearson, gave physician speech much
broader protection under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit
recognized that a physician's recommendation of medical marijuana
98. Id. (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535).
99. Id. (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535).
100. Id. (quoting Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 696 (N.D. Cal.
1997)). The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis with a discussion of
federalism, noting that its decision was consistent with notions of federalism
that have traditionally designated the states as the primary regulators of
professional conduct. Id.
101. 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
102. Id. at 120-22. Although the Pearson decision is not from a circuit
court, a comparison of that court's reasoning with the Ninth Circuit's in
Conant is appropriate because the cases have almost identical facts, and there
are very few (if any) circuit court cases that deal with this particular issue.
Moreover, there is no split among the circuit courts on this issue.
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is protected up until the point that the physician specifically intends
for a patient to use the recommendation to engage in illegal
activity. 103 In contrast, the district court in Pearsonheld that there is
no constitutional protection for a physician's recommendation of
medical marijuana because the speech itself is "'an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." ' 1°4 In reaching its
decision, the Pearson court attached a much higher degree of
regulation to physician speech. 10 5 Consequently, unlike the Conant
court, the Pearson court failed to address the issue of whether the
federal policy was a content-based restriction on speech. In addition,
because of its narrow holding regarding the illegality of a physician's
recommendation of medical marijuana, the court in Pearson did not
have to consider where to draw the line between a legal and an
illegal recommendation, as the court did in Conant.
A. The Ninth Circuit'sReasoning in Conant v. Walters Was Proper
1. Physician speech receives constitutional protection
First, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that communication
between a physician and a patient receives First Amendment
protection. In so holding, the court properly interpreted both Rust
Although neither case explicitly held that the
and Casey.
government may not impose viewpoint-based restrictions on
physician speech, some courts have held that, implicitly, Supreme
Court cases suggest there is First Amendment protection for such
speech.10 6 While the Rust Court did not specifically answer whether
103. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 635-36.

104. Pearson, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). The district court equated a physician's
recommendation of medical marijuana with a prescription for the drug, and, as
a result, the court found that the recommendation itself was a violation of
federal law under the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). Id.
105. See id. The court found that when speaking with a patient, a physician
engages in the practice of medicine which has a long history of regulation. Id.

106. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Discourse and the Right to Receive UnbiasedMedical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV.

201, 218-19, 265 (1994); see also Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has never held
that the physician-patient relationship, as such, receives special First
Amendment protection, its case law assumes, without so deciding, that the
relationship is a protected one").
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viewpoint-based restrictions on physician speech are proper in a
private context, there is a part of the majority's opinion that suggests
that speech restrictions that would affect
both public and private
07
unconstitutional.1
be
would
physicians
Casey, moreover, appears at first glance not to protect physician
speech. For example, even though the plurality recognized that the
challenged statute affected physicians' speech rights, the Court
dismissed the issue, finding that physician-patient communication is
simply a "part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State."' 08 As the Conant court
correctly noted however, the plurality in Casey did recognize that the
statute in question provided physicians the opportunity to abstain
from disclosing information which, in their medical judgment, would
harm a patient's mental or physical health.' 9 It follows, then, that
physicians should not have to remain silent about medical marijuana
if, in their expert judgment, the drug could help a patient's mental or
physical health.
The Conant court did not rely solely on Rust and Casey to
anchor physician-patient communication within the sphere of
constitutionally protected speech, however. Instead, the court
appropriately reached out to a broader set of cases such as Trammel
and FloridaBar to illustrate clearly the level of importance the Court
assigned to not only open and free communication between
physicians and patients, but also to professional speech in general.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Thompson, even
though the case dealt with commercial speech, was proper. While
the Ninth Circuit did not fully explore the Supreme Court's rationale
in Thompson for why commercial speech receives constitutional
protection, the Court's analysis in that case is equally applicable to
the speech in the present case. According to the Thompson Court,
"'[i]t is a matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. To this end, the free

107. Berg, supra note 106, at 211.
108. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992).
109. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 2002).
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flow of commercial information is indispensable."' 110 The Court
further emphasized that "'[t]he commercial marketplace.., provides
a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and
information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is
that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented."""' Certainly, it is a matter of
public interest to ensure that patients make health decisions that are
"intelligent and well-informed." In addition, there can be no doubt
that the free exchange of ideas is as "indispensable" in the physicianpatient context as it is in the commercial context because it affords
the patient the opportunity to know what options are available for
treatment and to personally assess, without interference from the
government, whether the information is of any value. If a physician
is barred by the government from presenting all possible treatment
options to a patient, then it is impossible for the patient to fully and
properly assess the value of such information.
2. Aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and the Brandenburgtest
After finding that physician-patient speech is protected by the
First Amendment, the court properly held that a physician's
recommendation of medical marijuana does not constitute illegal
conduct. The, plaintiff physicians simply wanted to be free to discuss
medical marijuana with their patients without the fear of government
retaliation. 1 2 zClearly, this case was not about "doctors prescribing,
growing, or distributing marijuana, nor [was] it about giving free
rein to patients to make massive purchases of marijuana for
distribution."" 3 The court made this point apparent when it held that
a physician's recommendation did not meet the elements of either
aiding and abetting or conspiracy.
Although the court chose not to do so, it could have analyzed
this issue using the Brandenburgtest to reach a similar result. Under
this test, .speech which advocates criminal conduct receives
constitutional protection unless it is "directed to inciting or
110. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366 (2002) (alteration
in original) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).

111. Id. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
112. See Conant,309 F.3d at 640 n.2 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
113. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."' 14 In other words, in order to be punishable, the speech
must satisfy both of the following requirements: 1) the speaker must
intend to incite an immediate illegal act, and 2) it must be likely that
the speaker will succeed in inciting such an act.
Given the facts of the present case, it seems certain that at least
one, if not both prongs, of this test are not met. When a physician
recommends medical marijuana to a patient, the physician is merely
informing the patient of possible treatments for the patient's illness.
It is not necessarily true that the physician intends for the patient to
immediately use the recommendation to obtain marijuana. 115 While
it may be possible to prove that a physician intended for a patient to
use a recommendation to obtain marijuana, it is uncertain whether
the second prong of the Brandenburgtest could be met. Moreover,
even if a physician were to advise a patient to obtain and use medical
marijuana, it is not a forgone conclusion that the patient would
act upon the physician's recommendation, especially since, under
federal law, the drug is still considered illegal, and in6 the states
where medical marijuana is legal, it is not easy to obtain. 1
3. First Amendment issues
Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that because
the federal policy forbids physicians from recommending medical
marijuana, it violates physicians' First Amendment rights. The court
clearly recognized that the federal policy sought to punish physicians
based not only on the content of their speech with their patients, but
117
also on the viewpoint they expressed on medical marijuana.
Because content-based restrictions, especially those targeted at a
particular viewpoint, are presumptively invalid, 1 8 the court properly
applied strict scrutiny.
First, the court correctly held that the federal policy did not
further a compelling government interest. The Supreme Court has
114. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
115. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
116. See generally United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that the dispensing of marijuana for medical
necessity by "medical cannabis dispensaries" is not exempted from prosecution
under the CSA).
117. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637.
118. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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made it clear that forbidding a particular message is, by definition, an
illegitimate government objective.19 There is no doubt that the
government in this case was seeking to suppress a particular
message: Medical marijuana may benefit some patients. Moreover,
although the government justified its policy by asserting that it had
an interest in keeping physicians from encouraging their patients to
engage in illegal conduct, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Court's
reasoning in Free Speech Coalition and rightly rejected the
government's argument. Because the court found that the connection
between physician speech and illegal conduct was so attenuated, it
properly declined to recognize the government's interest in
prohibiting the speech.
Finding that the government's policy was not justified by a
compelling interest, the Ninth Circuit then concluded that the federal
First, the court correctly
policy was not narrowly tailored.
recognized the vagueness of the federal policy, focusing on the fact
that the government never gave a clear definition of what speech the
policy proscribed.' 20 This, in turn, made physicians fearful of talking
about medical marijuana because they did not want the government
to sanction them for merely discussing, but not recommending, the
drug to their patients. 121 Ultimately, patients were left to decide what
constituted a recommendation of medical marijuana. 22 As a result,
physicians were suppressing their speech, even though the majority
of it was protected by the Constitution. 23 Clearly, if physicians were
refraining from engaging in constitutionally protected speech, then
the government did not narrowly tailor its federal policy to burden
the least possible speech.

119. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence .... Government action that stifles speech on

account of its message ... contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort
pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate

the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion." (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)).
120. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639.
121. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
122. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639.
123. Id.
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Button provided proper support for the court's conclusion that
the government did not narrowly tailor its policy regarding medical
marijuana. In that case, the Supreme Court held:
[First Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as
well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions. Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may
24
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.'
Thus, by making vague threats of sanctions, the government was
infringing upon the "breathing space" of physicians' free speech
rights because it was deterring physicians from speaking at all.
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Thomas is appropriate as well.
The Court in that case recognized the problems that arise when
listeners are allowed to define the meaning of a speaker's words,
stating that "[g]eneral words create different and often particular
impressions on different minds. No speaker, however careful, can
convey exactly his meaning, or the same meaning, to the different
members of an audience."' 125 If a patient were allowed to decide
whether a conversation about medical marijuana was either a simple
discussion about the drug or an outright recommendation of it,
physicians would be hesitant to initiate any discussion whatsoever
because they would be fearful of a patient's interpretation of the
conversation. Once again, because the policy is not narrowly
tailored, it forces physicians to suppress speech that may very well
receive First Amendment protection.
B. The DistrictCourt'sReasoning in Pearson Was Flawed as
Comparedto Conant
The plaintiffs in Pearson included physicians, patients, and
scientists, all of whom sought a preliminary injunction against many
of the same governmental agencies that were the defendants in
Conant.126 They alleged that the federal policy violated the First
Amendment rights of physicians and patients because the speech at
issue, prescribing and recommending medical marijuana, was "fully
124. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citations omitted).
125. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).

126. See Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2001).
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protected.' 27 As a result, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendants from initiating civil, criminal, or administrative
or
proceedings against physicians who wanted to prescribe
128
patients.
ill
seriously
their
to
marijuana
medical
recommend
In holding that the federal policy did not violate physicians'
First Amendment rights, the Pearson court gave the federal policy
deferential review, failing to address a number of issues raised by the
plaintiffs. Significantly, the court did not analyze whether the
federal policy was a content-based restriction. Instead, the court
focused its attention on the government's argument that a
recommendation of medical marijuana was essentially a prescription
for the drug. 129 Agreeing with the government's assertion, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had no First Amendment concerns
because it was clear that they could discuss the risks and benefits of
marijuana, so long as the discussion did not turn into a
recommendation. 130 Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, the court
found that when a physician has a discussion with a patient, the
discussion is part of the practice of medicine, and thus, it can be
regulated. 131 Lastly, because it held that a recommendation of
marijuana was itself a violation of federal law, the court did not need
to address just how far a recommendation could go before it crossed
the line into illegal conduct.
The district court's reasoning was faulty, however, because it
assumed that since some states allow a patient to use a physician's
recommendation to obtain marijuana, a recommendation is always
analogous to a prescription for the drug. 132 Based on this
assumption, the court concluded that even if state law allowed for a
prescription or recommendation of medical marijuana, "to do so is
still a violation of federal law under the CSA."' 133 Accordingly, the
court held that physicians could "freely discuss the risks and benefits
127. Id. at 117.
128. Id. at 115.

129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 120-21.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 120-21. The court stated that "the term 'recommend' has a

special significance under the law because patients [in California] are able to

take a recommendation for medicinal marijuana to a buyers' club to receive the
drug." Id. at 120.

133. Id. at 121.
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of medicinal marijuana," but it found that "the recommendation...
of the drug is a different issue."' 34 In reaching this conclusion, the
district court obviously did not entertain any other use for a
physician's recommendation of medical marijuana other than an
illegal one. Thus, in the court's mind, a recommendation could lead
to only one thing: an illegal prescription for medical marijuana.
This approach, as compared to the one in Conant, is clearly far
less protective of physician speech. Whereas Conant protected
physician speech, including recommendations of medical marijuana,
up until the point that the recommendation incited unlawful behavior,
Pearson cut protection off at the moment of recommendation.
Before adopting such a rigid interpretation of "recommendation," the
Pearson court should have applied either the reasoning from Conant
or the first prong of the Brandenburg test to address whether a
physician who recommends medical marijuana specifically intends
for a patient to commit an illegal act. Indeed, had the court applied
either analysis, it most likely would have discovered that not all
physicians intend for their recommendations of medical marijuana to
be like prescriptions that patients can use to obtain the drug.
Regrettably, the court's limited analysis prevented it from exploring
the possibility that a physician may recommend medical marijuana to
a seriously ill patient for a legal purpose, such as to enroll the patient
in a federally-approved government research program, or to
encourage the patient to become involved in the political debate over
medical marijuana. Thus, had the court expanded its perception of
what a "recommendation" is and how a physician intends for a
patient to use it, it would have afforded more protection to physician
speech.
Moreover, the Pearson court limited protection for physician
speech by holding that during a physician-patient conversation, the
physician engages in the practice of medicine, which can be
regulated to protect public safety.135 In contrast, the Conant court
did not sweep physician speech in with conduct, but instead treated it
separately. Consequently, the court in Conant found that such
professional speech received perhaps some of the strongest
constitutional protection. 136 If the Pearson court had followed this
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002).

1794

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37:1771

approach, much more physician speech would have been protected,
including a recommendation of medical marijuana.
In sum, the Pearsonreasoning, as compared to that in Conant, is
unsound, primarily because the court interpreted "recommendation"
so narrowly. Had the court considered that a recommendation could
mean something other than a prescription, it is likely that more
physician speech would have been protected. In addition, if the
Pearson court had not placed physician-patient conversations under
the umbrella of physician conduct, perhaps such discussions, even
those that included a recommendation of medical marijuana, would
have received First Amendment protection.
V. IMPLICATIONS

Several months after the Ninth Circuit decided Conant v.
Walters, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. On October 14, 2003, the Court
denied the petition. This makes the Conant decision all the more
significant because within the Ninth Circuit, it is the law.
The case is important for a number of reasons. To begin with, it
has broad First Amendment ramifications. Conant firmly places
physician-patient speech within the protection of the Constitution.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that restrictions on
discussions about medical marijuana violated the First Amendment.
Prior to this case, the courts only dealt with restrictions on physician
speech within the realm of abortion and contraception, and it was not
until Rust and Casey that the Supreme Court addressed whether
1 37
restrictions on physician-patient speech were unconstitutional.
Thus, Conant considered physician speech within a new areamedical marijuana-and used a First Amendment analysis to
conclude that restrictions on such speech were unconstitutional.
The case also marks a victory for seriously ill patients because
their doctors will feel safe to have open and honest discussions with
them about medical marijuana. 38 Thus, patients are more likely to
receive the information they need to make informed decisions about
137. See Berg, supra note 106, at 202-03.
138. There are some physicians who, despite the Ninth Circuit's holding, are
still fearful of recommending medical marijuana to their patients. See David
Tuller, Doctors Tread a Thin Line on MarijuanaAdvice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2003, at F5.
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their health care. Clearly, physicians may not go so far as to help
patients acquire medical marijuana, but at the very least, it is
imperative that physicians are able to discuss the drug with their
patients in an effort to provide them with proper care. 139 Indeed,
physicians' ability to have open conversations about medical
marijuana affects their patients' First Amendment rights. As Judge
Kozinski pointed out in his concurrence in Conant, "[i]t is well
established that the right to hear-the right to receive informationis no less protected by the First Amendment than the right to
speak."' 140 Judge Kozinski even went so far as to say that "[i]n this
case... it is perfectly clear that the harm to patients from being
denied the right to receive candid medical advice is far greater than
the harm to doctors from being unable to deliver such advice.''
Lastly, it is equally vital that seriously ill patients remain informed
about their medical options not only so that they can seek proper
treatment, but also so that they can become involved in the political
debate surrounding medical marijuana. Thus, Conant serves a twofold purpose in that it protects the right of physicians to recommend
medical marijuana and the right of patients to hear that information.
In addition to its First Amendment ramifications, the case also
has policy implications because it contributes to the debate about
medical marijuana. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Conant has not changed the fact that marijuana, even when used for
medical purposes, is still an illegal drug in the eyes of the federal
government. Thus, even though doctors can now recommend it to
their patients, there is not much that patients can do with the
recommendation.
Some options for patients include growing
1 42
marijuana themselves or buying it from marijuana buyers' clubs.
Another option may be for states to enact a state-run medical

139. See Berg, supra note 106, at 243-50 (discussing the importance of
patients' right to hear physician speech in order to make informed decisions
about their health care).
140. Conant, 309 F.3d at 643 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
142. J. Wells Dixon, Casenote, Conant v. McCaffrey: Physicians,
Marijuana, and the First Amendment, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 975, 979 (1999).
Unfortunately, the buyers' clubs are illegal, and the state of California and the
federal government are closing them down. Id. at 1010 n.208.
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marijuana regulatory program. 143 While California has not taken
such a drastic step as the latter option, former Governor Gray Davis
signed a bill in 2003 that established a state-sponsored identification
card for patients who use medical marijuana to protect them from
arrests. 1 4
On the other hand, even though Conant has not changed the
federal policy regarding medical marijuana, the Conant court looked
favorably upon the use of marijuana for medical purposes; hopefully,
as perceptions regarding the drug change, so will the federal
government's policies and regulations. According to a Time/CNN
poll conducted in 2002, 80 percent of Americans are in favor of
legalizing medical marijuana. 145 Moreover, nine states have enacted
medical marijuana laws,1 46 and another thirty-five states have passed
laws that either reduce the penalties for using medical marijuana or
otherwise recognize its medicinal value. 147 Given that a majority of
the population appears to have a more accepting view of medical
marijuana than does the federal government, it is significant that the
Ninth Circuit made a decision that reflects the nation's affirmative
attitude toward the drug.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Conant v. Walters has
not changed the federal government's policy regarding medical
marijuana, it is still an important case because it recognized that
physicians have a First Amendment right to discuss the drug with
their patients. Unlike the court in Pearson, the court in Conant
acknowledged that the federal policy was a content-based restriction
because it prohibited both speech and a viewpoint on a particular
143. See generally Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana:Should the
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1787 (2003) (arguing that a staterun medical marijuana program may be the best strategy available to patients
who seek a system of legal medical marijuana distribution because it is
possible that, under the Commerce Clause, such a system could escape federal
regulation).
144. Tuller, supra note 138, at F5.
145. Joel Stein, The New Politics of Pot: Can it Go Legit?, TIME, Nov. 4,
2002, at 56.
146. See discussion supra note 7.
147. Clarence Page, So Long to a Misguided Gag Rule on the Medicinal Use
ofMarjuana, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 2003, at C27.
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topic. Because the federal policy was both content and viewpointbased, the Conant court properly used a strict scrutiny analysis. The
court found that the government did not have a compelling interest in
prohibiting physicians from discussing medical marijuana with their
patients, and it also found that the government did not narrowly tailor
the policy so as to restrict the least amount of speech possible.
Finally, the Conant court established a limit on what physicians
could say to their patients, holding that if a physician who
recommended medical marijuana intended to help a patient obtain
the drug illegally, then the physician could be found guilty of aiding
and abetting a crime.
The implications of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Conant are
far-reaching. For one thing, the court established for the first time
that patient-physician speech regarding medical marijuana receives
First Amendment protection. In so holding, the court has not only
impacted physicians and their free speech rights, but it has also
significantly affected patients by supporting their First Amendment
right to receive information from their physicians regarding medical
marijuana. Thus, patients will now be better informed about their
medical options, which, in turn, will allow them to make better
decisions about their treatment. Furthermore, because Conant
presents a generally positive position on medical marijuana, it will
presumably have some influence on the current debate that surrounds
the drug. Indeed, as popular support for medical marijuana grows,
perhaps the federal government will change its policies, which
currently place severe restrictions on the recommendation and use of
the drug.
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